Chapter One The Gentry and the Imperial Power

第壹章 士绅与皇权

The term "gentry," shen-shih, refers to a class of persons with a definite position and definite functions in the traditional society of China. Here, by "traditional society," is meant the period after the breakdown of feudalism and the unification of the empire under a centralized monarchical power not long before 200 B.C. The development of the gentry class has a history; only through this history can we understand its characteristics.

The class that is here called gentry is also sometimes referred to as shih ta fu, "scholar-official." Actually the gentry class, although closely linked with the group of scholar-officials, should be distinguished from it. To be born into a gentry family did not necessarily insure that one became a scholar or an official in traditional China. Under feudalism the situation was different. At that time the gap between the nobles and the commoners was great. Shih[1] and ta fu[2], although they were the bottom of the hierarchy of the ruling class, were still a part of that class and as such possessed real political power. But after the breakdown of feudalism political power was no longer portioned out but became concentrated in the person of one man, the monarch. In order to carry out his administrative functions, the monarch required assistance. This was given him by the officials. The officials then were no longer relatives or members of the ruler's own family but rather employees—the servants, or tools, of the monarch.

After the breakdown of feudalism there was another important change. The throne became the object of capture by the strong, by the hunters after power. Under feudalism, in which political power was distributed to relatives and kin, anyone not born into a noble family was a common man who had no chance of reaching the throne, of touching or even of seeing the divine paraphernalia of monarchy. No more than a woman can change into a man could a common man become royal. But, when feudalism went, anyone could become emperor. Thus political power became an object of struggle. This is illustrated by the story told by the historian Ch'ien Ssu-ma of Xiang Yu, who during the Ch'in dynasty (221–206 B.C.), in watching an imperial procession, said to his friend, "This I can seize." Since that time the struggle for political power has never ceased. Political power in the eyes of the people has become something precious to be sought after, an enterprise for large-scale entrepreneurs.

“士绅”这个词，指的是在中国传统社会中占有一定地位、发挥一定功能的一个阶层。这里所谓的“传统社会”是指临近公元前3世纪时封建制度解体之后，由中央集权一统天下的帝国时期。士绅阶层有其自身的发展历史，只有通过这一历史，我们才能了解其特征。

本书所讲的士绅阶层有时也被称为“士大夫”。实际上，虽然士绅阶层与士大夫群体紧密相连，但仍应把他们区分开来。出身于士绅家庭，并不能确保此人将来一定会成为中国传统社会中的文人或官员。在封建时代，情形便不大一样。封建时代的贵族和平民之间存在有不可逾越的鸿沟。“士”[3]和“大夫”[4]虽然处于统治阶级等级体系的最底层，但他们仍属于统治阶级的一部分，并拥有真正的政治权力。但封建制度解体后，政权不再分散，而是集中在最高统治者一人手里。为了实施管理，最高统治者需要辅佐。这种辅佐是由官吏来提供的。因此，这里的官吏不再是统治者的家族成员或亲戚，而是他的雇佣，即仆人或者统治工具。

封建制度解体后发生了另一重要的变化，皇权成为强者、权力追逐者竞相争夺的目标。在封建制度下，政权分配给统治者的亲戚和家属，出生在贵族家庭之外的人是平民，他们永远没有机会登上王位，没有机会触摸君王的神圣用具，甚至连看的机会也没有。平民要想成为皇室的成员就像女人要变成男人一样不大可能。但是，封建制度解体后，任何人都有可能成为皇帝。这样，政治权力就成为大家争夺的目标。历史学家司马迁描述过这样一个故事：秦朝（公元前221年—公元前206年）时的项羽在观看皇家列队时对他的朋友说：“彼可取而代之。”从那以后，争夺政治权力的斗争从来就没有停止过。政治权力在人们的眼里已成为竞相猎取的宝贝，要做大买卖的就干这个。

Unfortunately, since the breakdown of the feudal structure in China, political power has no longer been transmitted permanently in certain families, and up to the present no peaceful means of attaining it has ever been found. We continue to be convinced that the way to gain political power is through "taking up the stick" and fighting civil wars. Those few who emerge victorious in this struggle become emperors; the defeated become bandits. So we have had a succession of tyrants. A few people rule the mass. The nature of this despotic monarchy is not changed by the handing-on or relaying of power. In England, when a monarch was killed, monarchical power itself received a blow. Changes of monarchy led in time to a growth in the power of the people and to a government monarchic in name only. But, in China, blood flows from the people's veins, while those who attain the throne are but a few fortunate adventurers, like Liu Pang, the first emperor of the Han, who was born a lowly peasant, or Chu Yuan-chang, the founder of the Ming dynasty. When we study official versions of Chinese history, we find presented to us a continuous line of dynastic descent; but we should not forget that the authority of these rulers was continuously challenged by civil wars and unscrupulous adventurers.

To struggle for political power by violence is dangerous. If a man succeeds, he may become emperor; but, if he loses, he will be killed, and not only he himself but his whole family and clan. When he is challenging the established emperor, he is called a bandit and rebel, and the might of the army is directed against him. Moreover, the empire gained by violence may be lost by violence also. Twice in history, according to tradition, emperors tried to give up their power to other men who they thought would make better rulers. But those to whom the power was offered did not want it. They preferred to run away rather than to take on the responsibility. We do not know how far these two emperors were sincere in their desire to give up their power and to what extent this action was no more than a gesture or a piece of complicated political intrigue. There is no question of the fact, however, that in all of Chinese recorded history there is not a single case of voluntary abdication from the throne. Those abdications which did take place were forced. "The empire that was won on horseback will be lost only on horseback," as the popular saying goes.[5]

To seek to become a monarch is to risk one's life. The heir to the throne must uphold his succession. The emperor, who should be merciful, may pardon all other crimes but not the crime of attempted usurpation. That is the most terrible thing that can be attempted under heaven. To anyone who reads the records of the beginnings of the Ming dynasty, the account of tortures applied to those who menaced the throne sounds like an account of progress through hell. I was told that the models of the "eighteen hells" found in district Buddhist temples are reminiscent of what was really done in the Ming dynasty. The threat of torture was the emperor's protection. I remember once as a boy calling out in play, "I am the emperor." My grandmother stopped me at once, saying, "You must never say that." This was not superstition or overcaution on her part but a recognition of a real danger in rash speaking. According to tradition at least, emperors used to have those children killed whom fortune-tellers foretold would one day become monarchs.

不幸的是，中国封建制度里解放出来的政权，固然不再专属一姓、万世一系了，但是到现在还没有找出一个夺取政权的和平方式。我们一说起夺取政权，就忘不了“揭竿而起”的内战手段。武力争夺的方式下，政权变成了“成则为王、败则为寇”的夺宝对象。夺来夺去，以暴易暴，总是极少数人统治着其他的人民，专制的皇权并没有在政权的传承和接替中发生任何性质上的改变。我们不像英国——杀了一个皇帝，皇权减少了一些，民权抬了一些头；赶走一个皇帝，皇权又减少了一些，民权再抬一些头；最后竟成了个挂名皇帝，取消了皇权——但是，在传统中国只有“取而代之”的故事，流的是人民的血，得到宝座的却是少数幸运的“流氓”，像下层农民出身的汉朝开国皇帝刘邦、明朝开国皇帝朱元璋等一派人物就是。在官方修撰的史籍上，固然有着一脉相承的正统；可事实上，大小规模的内战和肆无忌惮的冒险者恐怕是经常的现象，史不绝书，不断挑战着统治者的权威。

以武力争夺政权是危险的事。成固然可以称王，败则只有一死；非但一死，而且还会灭族。当他向当政的皇帝提出挑战时，他就成为寇匪或反贼，军队会冲他而来。况且，通过暴力得来的政权可能也会因暴力而丧失。历史上曾有过两次，依照传统，皇帝试图把政权让给他认为是更好的统治者的人。但是那些人并不想得到政权，他们宁可远离而不愿肩负责任。我们无从得知这两位皇帝让出政权的诚心有多大，也不清楚在何种程度上，这不过是一种姿态或是复杂的政治阴谋。但是有一个事实无法否认：中国有记载的历史中，没有一个皇帝主动退位让出皇权；曾经有过让位的例子，但那是出于被迫。常言道：马背上得天下，亦只于马背上失天下。[6]

想当君王实际上是拿生命去冒险。王位继承人肯定要保住其继承权。作为皇帝应该仁慈，他可以赦免其他所有罪行，而唯独不能对谋反篡权罪手软。谋反是天底下最可怕的事。任何读过明朝初期历史的人都知道，书中描写的对谋反分子施加的酷刑仿佛是在地狱中发生的一样。我们在城隍庙里所见到的“十八层地狱”的形象，据说是写实的，是明史的标本。酷刑的威胁便是皇帝的保护伞。记得小时候，有一次我在玩耍中大喊了一句：“我是皇帝！”祖母急忙阻止我说：“这是不能说的！”她并不是迷信，也非过于小心，而是意识到信口一句话会带来的实际的危险。至少依照传统来看，皇帝常会把那些据算命先生讲长大会做皇帝的孩子杀死。

But this threat of violence has never really given effective protection to monarchical power. As Lao-tzu says, "When one does not fear death, how is it possible to threaten a man with death?" When it is possible to gain political power through violence, the throne is tempting. Though the brutality of those in authority may silence the majority, repression will never be entirely successful. The magnitude of the stakes, an imperial power which could be used to realize any whim, could not but make the effort attractive in spite of dangers. On the one hand, there were those who were willing to gamble with their lives; on the other, there were those who submitted quietly. One may ask, then, what it was that decided on which side a man should be.

Under monarchical rule the people had only duties without rights; the emperor's word was law. If he wanted to build a great palace, an imposing tomb, or a grand canal, he ordered it done without regard for the people. If he wanted to expand the boundaries of his kingdom, he commanded his army to mobilize regardless of whether the people liked it or not. The paying of taxes, the conscription of soldiers—these were burdens for the people to accept without compensation. Those who have lived under despotic monarchical power will understand Confucius' saying, "A brutal monarch is even worse than a tiger."[7] This policy of despotism more fearful than a tiger has had a long history in China. So we say, when the tiger comes out from his cage, the frightened people escape to the Liang hills.[8]

Upon all who are unarmed, we may say, the threat of political tyranny falls with equal weight. Yet in this, too, there have always existed differences. The richer folk could afford to pay for security. In the Chinese traditional pattern conscription, for example, could be bought off. The breaking-up of a family such as is described in "Old Poem" could never have happened in a rich family.[9] Thus it was that people from this class became political adventurers.

但是，武力的威胁并没有真正有效地保护皇权。正如老子所言：“民不畏死，奈何以死惧之？”当通过暴力夺取政权成为可能时，王权就变得异常诱人。虽然统治者的暴行可以使多数人保持沉默，但压迫永远也不会完全奏效。在予取予夺的专制皇权下，政权可以用来谋取私人的幸福，社会也可以从顺逆的界限上分出敢于冒大不韪的人和不敢冒大不韪的人。那么，有人就会问了，敢与不敢这样的事情是怎样决定的呢？

在专制政权之下，人民只有义务而没有权利，皇帝的话就是法律。皇帝如果想要建造一座宏大的宫殿、巨大的陵墓，或是挖一条大运河，他不会顾及百姓，只是下令让手下人去做。如果他想开疆拓土，就会命令军队去动员，不管人民愿不愿意。赋税和兵役都是百姓难以接受的负担，并且没有任何的补偿。生活在暴虐的专制统治下的人们很容易理解孔子的“苛政猛于虎也”这句话。[10]这种比老虎更可怕的暴政在中国有很长的历史。所以我们说，这政治老虎出了栏，就会吓得人逼上梁山了。[11]

专政统治的威胁对所有手无寸铁的人来讲，其威力都是一样的，但常常也有不同。富人可以用银子来买安全。比如，古代中国的征兵制度中有用银子来代替服兵役的做法。古诗中描写的支离破碎的家庭绝不会是富人家。[12]因此恰恰是出自贫民阶层的人变成了政治上的冒险者。

The possession of riches or the lack of them was what was important for making some acquiesce and others rebel. "Man fears to be distinguished as a pig fears to be fat." When the political tiger attacks, the man who is rich will have a greater difficulty in escaping than the man without property. In such a case property becomes a burden. Propertied families developed great alertness in watching the behavior of the tiger. The poor man who has become desperate may rebel, become a bandit in the mountains, and even, in time, challenge the royal authority itself. But a man of property and family cannot easily do this. He must find some way to avoid the attack of the tiger. Unfortunately, as the old saying goes, "From the water's edge, all land is the emperor's; under the heavens all are the emperor's men." At that time travel was not easy; one could not run away to Washington or Brazil, nor was there any International Settlement in a treaty port, nor even any Hong Kong. Physically there was no escape. Perhaps this is not quite true, after all, because we know that from early times certain individuals were able to escape to Korea or Japan. But the ordinary man had to find some means of protection within the structure of society itself.

There was a weak point, however, in this centralized monarchical system. He who held power, the emperor, as I have said, could not administer the country by himself. Even though he might not wish to share his authority, he still required help in ruling and must therefore employ officials. These officials, with whom the ruling house had no ties of kinship, functioned merely as servants with administrative power but no power of policy-making. It was within the inefficiencies of this system that the ordinary man found his opportunity to carry on his private concerns.

It is true that previous to the unification of Ch'in (221 B.C.) there were attempts to establish an efficient administrative system. This was done under the influence of the Fa Chia, or Legalist, school of thought. Theoretically, the system proposed by this school of thought was a good one.[13] In order to have an efficient administration of the country, a legal basis must be established, with everyone controlled by the same law. Shang Yang, as prime minister of Ch'in, attempted to put this theory into practice. But the theory unfortunately neglected one small point. One man, the emperor, was left outside the law. And this omission destroyed the whole system of the Fa Chia.[14]

财富的占有和匮乏是导致沉默和反抗的重要原因。“人怕出名猪怕壮。”当政治猛虎出击的时候，富有者比穷人更难以逃脱灾难，这时候财富变成了负担。富贵人家善于对“老虎”察言观色，而绝望的穷人也许会揭竿而起，或是落草为寇，甚至迟早直接向皇权发起挑战。一个有家室、有财产的人不会轻易这么做，他必须设法摆脱“老虎”的攻击。不幸的是，正如古人所言：“普天之下，莫非王土；率土之滨，莫非王臣。”那时出门可不容易，不能跑到华盛顿或巴西，也不可能在任何一个通商口岸寻求国际避难，甚至也没有香港这类地方。在地理空间上是无处可逃的。但也许并不完全如此，毕竟我们知道有些人在早年就逃到了朝鲜或日本。但是，一般人只能在现有的社会体制下寻找自我保护的途径。

不过，这种集权的专制统治有一个弱点，正如我说的那样，掌握政权的皇帝，不能独自管理国家。即使他不愿意让别人分享权力，他仍需要任命官吏做助手和代理，协助其实施统治。这些官吏与皇室没有亲戚关系，如同皇帝的雇佣，他们没有立法权，只有行政管理权。在这种效率低下的制度下，普通百姓才有机会产生私欲。

在秦朝统一国家（公元前221年）以前，确实曾有些人想要建立一个富有效率的行政机构。这是受到了法家学派的思想的影响。从理论上来讲，这一学派提出的体系是好的。[15]有效率的行政机构必须是一个法制的机构，所有人都要受到同样的法律的控制。作为秦国宰相的商鞅试图要将这一理论付诸实践。可不幸的是，这一理论有一点小小的疏忽——有一个人没有被纳入法律之内，那就是天子。这留在法律之外的一个人却把法家的整个体系废黜了。[16]

Shang Yang himself lost his life on this account, for, though under the law he was able to punish the prince when he was only the heir to the throne,[17] as soon as the prince became emperor, he ordered Shang Yang killed. And the efficient system which Shang Yang himself had established prevented him from escaping.

If the highest authority were bound by law, then administrative authority would be able to cage the tiger. But in Chinese history this has never happened. As a result, the ruled, including the officials themselves, have never sought for efficiency in administration. Rather the opposite has been true. Inefficiency and parasitism, on the one hand, remoteness of imperial control and a do-nothing policy by the emperor, on the other—this has always been the ideal. Yet this ideal of government, of a "good emperor" as one who presided but did not rule, has rarely been attained. As far as the officials were concerned, the next best thing, then, could only be to protect themselves, to keep a back door open for their relatives, and to be able to use their position as a shield against the emperor's whims. To protect not only themselves but their relatives and their whole clan from the unchecked power of the monarch, and to do this not by constitutional or by legal means but by personal influence—this is what they sought. Not by challenging the emperor's authority but by coming close to him, by serving him and from this service gaining an advantage in being enabled to shift the burden of the emperor's demands onto the backs of those lower down, did the propertied class attempt to neutralize the emperor's power over them and to avoid the attack of the tiger. Groups of officials, with their relatives, formed, thus, in Chinese society a special class not affected by the laws, exempt from taxation and conscription. Nevertheless, they had no real political power.

To escape domination while approaching the source of power takes a highly developed skill. The position of the officials was not easy. As the old sayings go, "When the emperor orders your death, you must die" and "All the blame is mine; the emperor can do no wrong." If the official relaxed his efforts on behalf of the emperor, he might lose his life. When the emperor required money or labor, he must be active in meeting these demands—a task he accomplished by shifting the burden onto the backs of the people. Yet, if the burdens became too heavy for the people to bear, they might rebel, and it was then the officials who would be attacked first and who would serve as the scapegoats of the monarch.[18] The officials must be two-faced: severe toward the people and compliant toward the emperor. They must know the art of going just so far and no further in order that they might not be caught either by the fury of the emperor or by the wrath of the people. Chinese officials' life has been described as the art of maneuvering on a stormy sea. Experience through the ages was the teacher. It may be noted that in Chinese the expression, "Do not speak to me officially," does not mean the same thing as in English but rather, "Speak to me sincerely."

商鞅因此自己把命丢了，尽管在法律之下，他能够对还只是王位继承人的太子加以惩罚[19]，但是太子一当上皇帝就下令将商鞅杀掉，由商鞅自己所建立起来的高效率的体系也使他自己在劫难逃。

如果最高的权威受到了法律的约束，那么行政的权威就能够将这只老虎囚住。但是在中国的历史上，这样的事情从来没有发生过。结果，被统治者——包括官吏自己在内——从来就不追求行政上的效率。实际的情况正是与之相对立。一方面是无效率和寄生，另一方面是天高皇帝远以及皇帝的无为政策——这一直是一种理想的状态。然而这种政府的理想，即是说一位“好皇帝”应当统而不治，这样的皇帝很少有人能够做到。就官吏而言，退而求其次的办法就只能是保护他们自己，为他们的亲戚开后门，并且还能够利用他们的位置作为一种挡箭牌来抵御皇帝的变化无常。要保护的不仅是他们自己，还有他们的亲戚以及整个宗族免遭不受限制的君主权力的侵扰，而且这样做所依靠的并非是宪法或者法律的手段，而是依靠个人的影响力——这就是他们所追求的。有产阶级想要消磨掉皇帝加诸他们身上的权力，并以此来避开这只老虎的攻击，并非是靠对皇帝的权威加以挑战，而是靠亲近皇帝、为皇帝服务，从中获得的一种好处便是能够将皇帝各种要求的负担转移给比自己阶层更低者。官僚及其庇护下的亲友集团由此构成了中国社会所特有的一个不受法律影响的阶层，他们有免役免税的特权。虽然如此，但他们并没有真正的政治权力。

逃避自己想要接近的权力之源的支配，需要有高超的技能。官僚的位置并不轻松。正如古语所言：“君要臣死，臣不得不死”，还有“臣罪当诛，天王圣明”。他不能怠工而有损皇帝的利益，否则可能性命不保。当皇帝需要钱或劳力的时候，他必须特别卖力来满足这些需要，即通过把整个的政治负担转嫁到平民身上来完成这项差事。但是，一旦这种负担过重，人民无法承受之时，他们便可能起来造反，到时就是这些官僚们首当其冲地受到攻击，由此而成了国君的替罪羊。[20]官僚们必须有两套面目：对人民严酷而对皇帝顺从。他们必须要知道进退有节，适可而止，以免走了极端而惹恼了皇帝，或者是引起人民的激愤。中国官僚们的生活曾被描述为是在风云变幻的海上运筹帷幄的艺术。代代相传的经验即为人师。应该注意的是，在汉语中所说的“不要打官腔”，并非与英语字面的意思一样，而实际是在说：“跟我说实话。”

In normal times to be an official was no direct economic advantage. From the monarch's point of view, for an official to use his position to enrich himself meant corruption of the system and a diminution of his own treasure. Thus, unless a monarch were very weak, he would not tolerate such officials. An official in ordinary times would not improperly profit from the office but would leave it with "two sleeves full of wind."[21]

Why, then, should people want to be officials? The poem of T'ao Yuan-ming expresses the feelings of one such man:

Why should I be an official?

I bend my back

For only three piculs of rice

Why should I not go back to till the land?[22]

T'ao Yuan-ming was a typical unworldly poet. Yet, in spite of his talent and his interest in the things of the mind, even he had to "bend his back" and occupy an official position and withal receive only a small financial reward. Why did such a one accept this position instead of staying home where he was happy? The fact is that, if he had shown his scorn of officialdom by leaving office, he would probably by now be "a man without an arm."[23] The choice lay between "bending the back" or being disabled. The necessity for becoming an official was a little like the need for being inoculated. Just as one runs the risk of having a bad reaction to an inoculation, so in becoming an official one may risk having one's property confiscated or even one's head cut off. But, once the inoculation is over, one has gained protection. This analogy is not too apt, since from an inoculation one person becomes immune, whereas if one has been an official one can protect a whole group of people. As a result, it happened that sometimes a group would join to aid in the education of one man so as to enable him to reach officialdom. "One man rises to officialdom, then all his dogs and chickens will be promoted," is the saying.

在平常的日子里，做官并没有什么直接的经济上的好处。在皇帝看来，官员利用自己的职位来致富，不仅意味着腐化皇权所依赖的制度，而且是皇家财富的减缩。因此，除非某位皇帝软弱无能，否则，他是不会容许有这种官员存在的。处在太平盛世的官员不会不合法地从官位上捞到好处，而只会在离任时留下“两袖清风”。[24]

那么，为什么人们还想要做官呢？陶渊明的诗表达了这种感慨：

我为什么要去做官呢？

只为五斗米折腰。

我为什么不归耕田园？[25]

陶渊明是一位典型的出世诗人。尽管他富有才气，也很有风雅，但他还是“折了腰”，身居一个官位，仅仅是为了得到那么一点俸禄。为什么这样的一个人要去接受这样的一个位置，而不是呆在他所喜欢的家里呢？事实恰恰是，如果他真的表现出自己看不上官职，弃官而去，他就可能成为一位“折臂翁”了。[26]这就是说必须在“折腰”和“折臂”之间作出选择。做官的必要性有点像打防疫针。正像打防疫针要冒打了过后有不良反应的风险一样，做官就可能要冒抄家和掉脑袋的危险。但是，一旦打了针后，人就可以有免疫力了。这样的比喻略有点不贴切，因为打了防疫针，只能够使一个人自己得到免疫，而做官所能庇护的是一整群的人。结果有时就出现了一大群人资助一个人去读书，以便使他能够获得个一官半职；一人升官，鸡犬安宁。

In Chinese traditional society the clan or big family naturally constituted a group which could take action of this sort, supporting one of their members until the time when he should become a scholar and be eligible for the official examinations. Once this individual attained official honors, the whole clan could rely upon him. Without any strong person at court, it was difficult to protect one's property. Ku T'ing-lin was an official during the Ming dynasty, but, when the rule passed to the Manchus, he refused to continue in an official position, gave up traveling abroad, and shut himself up at home with his books. Yet for his own protection he was obliged to send his two nephews to the Ch'ing court to serve his enemies. This was made possible by the fact that, as we have said, Chinese officials did not share in the political power of the emperor but served their monarch by neutralizing and softening down his power rather than by supporting it. With his nephews in court, the uncle was protected even in secret rebellious activities. According to Chinese tradition, officials did not work seriously for the government, nor did they like to continue as officials for a long period. Their purpose in entering the government was to gain both immunity and wealth in this order. The Chinese officials when in office protected their relatives, but, when this duty to the family had been performed, they retired. Retirement and even a hermit's life were the ideal. In retirement there was no longer any authority to be served with watchful care, while the relatives who had gained protection from their kinsman official owed him a debt of gratitude. Now he need only enjoy his social prestige and grow fat and happy. As we say in China, "To come back to one's native soil, beautifully robed and loaded with honors, is the best thing in life."[27] Such a man will not attempt to seize power; his children will not play at being emperor. Nor will he have any idea of reforming the social system, for that system will do him no harm. Once out of the way of imperial influences, he may enjoy the economic power of a landowner.

This is the sort of man I mean by gentry. The gentry may be returned officials or the relatives of officials or simply educated landowners. In any case, they have no real political power in shaping policies and may have no direct connection with politics whatsoever, yet they do tend to have influence at court and to be immune from political exploitation. And the more fearful the ruler and the more tiger-like, the more valuable is the gentry's protective covering. In such circumstances it is difficult to survive except by attaching one's self to some big family.

在中国传统社会中，宗族和大家庭自然就构成了这样的一个团体，这个团体所做的一件事情就是供其中一员去上学，一直到他考上了功名，得了一官半职，一族人就有靠山了。若在朝廷里没有靠山，在乡间想保持财产是困难的。顾亭林是明朝的一位官员，当改朝换代成了清朝，他拒绝再任官员，深居简出，闭门读书。但是为了安全和保障，他还是不得不派两名外甥到朝廷里去侍奉他的敌人。正如我们已经说过的，这之所以可能做到，是因为中国官员不是与皇帝分享政治权力，是通过淡化和弱化而非支持其权力来服务于君主。外甥做官，保障了舅舅的安全，甚至使舅舅能安心地去下革命的种子。中国传统的官吏并不认真做官，更不想终身做官：打防疫针的人绝不以打针为乐，目的在免疫和免了疫的健康。中国的官吏在做官时庇护其亲友，做了一阵，他任务完成，就要告老还乡了，即所谓“归去来兮”那一套。退隐山林是中国人的理想。这时，上边不必再小心伺候随时可以杀他的主子，周围是感激他的亲戚街坊。此时他只需要享受他的社会声望，生活富足，心宽体胖。正如中国人所说的，“衣锦还乡是人生活中最美好的事情”。[28]他绝不冒险去觊觎政权，他的孩子都不准玩“做皇帝”的游戏。他更不想改革社会制度，因为这种社会制度对他并没有害处。一旦他脱离开皇权的限制，他就可以享受地主的经济权利。

这种人就是我所谓的“士绅”。士绅可以是退任的官僚，或是官僚的亲属，甚至可以是受过教育的地主。在任何情况下，他们都没有左右政策的实际的政治权力，可能与政治也没有任何直接的联系，可是他们常常有势力，势力就是政治免疫性。统治者越可怕，越像猛虎一样，士绅的保护性的庇护作用就越大。在此情况下，托庇于豪门才有命。

---

[1] Shih: "This word is often translated 'scholar,' but this is only a derived, metaphorical sense and the whole force of many passages in the Analects is lost if we do not understand that the term is a military one and means "knight.' A shih was a person entitled to go to battle in a war-chariot, in contrast with the common soldiers who followed on foot. Confucius, by a metaphor similar to those embodied in the phraseology of the Salvation Army, calls the stout-hearted defenders of his Way 'Knights'; and hence in later Chinese the term came to be applied to upholders of Confucianism and finally to scholars and literary people in general. The burden of most of the references to shih in the Analects is that the Knight of the Way needs just the same qualities of endurance and resolution as the Soldier Knight" (Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938], pp. 33–34).

[2] Ta fu: lower-ranking official under feudalism.

[3] “士”这个字“英文经常译成‘scholar（学者）’，这只是一个引申出的比喻义，实际上此词与军事有关，是‘骑士’的意思，如果我们不这样理解，《论语》中很多篇幅就会完全丧失意义。‘士’是可以乘战车奔赴战场的，而普通士兵只能徒步其后。孔子打了一个比方，这个比方所指的人与有着‘救世军’称号的人是相似的，孔子把英勇护卫其道的人称作‘骑士’。因此，在后来的汉语中，这个词用来指拥护孔子思想的人，最后统指文人。《论语》中大多数关乎‘士’这个字的重点都是指需要像战士中的骑士一样具有那种忍耐力和不屈不挠禀性的卫道士”。引自《论语》英文版，阿瑟·韦利译，伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1938年，第33—34页。

[4] “大夫”：封建制度下地位较低的官吏。

[5] This phrase seems to refer back to the story told of Kao-tsu, the first emperor of Han, and the Confucian scholar Lu Chia. "After his [Lu Chia's] return in 196 or 195 B.C., he is said to have quoted the Book of Odes and the Book of History to Kao-tsu, whereat the latter scolded him and said, 'I got the empire on horseback; why should I bother with the Book of Odes or the Book of History?' Lu Chia replied, 'You got it on horseback, but can you rule it from horseback?' Then he proceeded to quote cases, from ancient history, of kings who had lost their thrones through their wickedness, concluding with the Ch'in dynasty, which Kao-tsu had himself overthrown" (Pan Ku, The History of the Former Han Dynasty, trans. Homer H. Dubs [Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1938], I, 21).

[6] 此句源于汉代开国皇帝高祖与儒生陆贾的故事。“公元前196年或前195年，陆贾出使回来后，据说他对高祖引述了《诗经》和《书经》的话。高祖责备他说：我从马上得到天下，何必计较《诗经》和《书经》呢？！（乃公居马上而得之，安事《诗》、《书》！）陆贾则回答道：您可以在马上得天下，但是您能在马上治理天下吗？（马上得之，宁可以马上治之乎？）然后，他引经据典，历数古代帝王由于暴虐丢掉王位的史实，直到高祖推翻的秦朝。”引自班固《汉书》英文版，德效骞译，1938年，巴尔的摩：韦弗利出版社，第1卷，第21页。

[7] "As they [Confucius and his disciples] passed by the T'ai mountain, the attention of the travellers was arrested by a woman weeping and wailing at a grave. The sage stopped, and sent one of his followers to ask the reason of her grief. 'My husband's father,' said she, 'was killed here by a tiger, and my husband also, and now my son has met the same fate.' Being asked why she did not leave so fatal a spot, she replied that there was there no oppressive Government. 'Remember this,' said Confucius to his disciples, 'remember this, my children, oppressive government is fiercer and more feared than a tiger' " (James Legge, Life of Confucius, in Vol. I of The Chinese Classics [2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895], quoted from Li Chi, pp. 67–68).

[8] The Liang hills are here a reference to the Chinese novel, Ju Hu (All Men Are Brothers), in which it is told how men of many sorts, fleeing from harsh punishments of the authorities, came to band themselves together and lived by defying the government and preying upon the rich and powerful. Stories of this sort had a very real basis in fact. In Pan Ku's History of the Former Han Dynasty we read, for example: "Ch'ên Shê was an ambitious farm boy who became one of the chiefs of a levy of men made in the present southern Honan.... In the later-summer of 209 B.C., a bad rain prevented this levy from reaching its destination on time. According to Ch'in laws, the officers and men of the levy would have been condemned to death; they accordingly conspired to rebel. As a slogan they falsely called themselves partisans of Fu-su, the displaced heir of the First Emperor, and fabricated miracles to legitimize themselves. The rebellion was not thus at first openly directed against the dynasty, but was merely the act of men driven to desperation by over-harsh laws" (I, 4).

[9] "Old Poem," translated by Arthur Waley from The Book of Songs, reads:

"At fifteen I went with the army, At fourscore I came home. On the way I met a man from the village, I asked him who there was at home. 'That over there is your house, All covered with trees and bushes.' Rabbits had run in at the dog-hole, Pheasants flew down from the beams of the roof. In the courtyard was growing some wild grain; And by the well, some wild mallows. I'll boil the grain and make porridge, I'll pluck the mallows and make soup. Soup and porridge are both cooked, But there is no one to eat them with. I went out and looked towards the cast, While tears fell and wetted my clothes." (Arthur Waley, Chinese Poems [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1946], p. 51.)

[10] “当他们（孔子和他的学生）路过泰山时，发现一个妇人在坟前哭。孔子停下脚步，让学生前去打探原因。妇人说：‘我的公公和丈夫都在这里被老虎吃掉了，如今我的儿子也没能逃脱这个厄运。’当问她为什么不离开这个不幸的地方时，妇人说这里没有官府的压迫。孔子对学生说：‘记住啊，学生们，残暴的统治比老虎更可怕。’”（孔子过泰山侧，有妇人哭于墓者而哀。夫子式而听之，使子路问之，曰：“子之哭也，壹似重有忧者。”而曰：“然。昔者吾舅死于虎，吾夫又死焉，吾子又死焉。”夫子问：“何为不去也？”曰：“无苛政。”夫子曰：“小子识之，苛政猛于虎也。）出自《礼记》，引自《中国典籍》第1卷之“孔子生平”，理雅各编译，伦敦：克拉伦登出版社，1895年，第2版，第67—68页。

[11] 梁山典故出自中国古典小说《水浒》，该书讲述了各色人等为逃避官府压迫而聚集在一起，杀富济贫，公然反对官府的故事。事实上，这类故事有深厚的现实基础。例如，班固在《汉书》中写道，陈胜（字涉）是一名有鸿鹄之志的农民，后来成为今属河南南部征募上来的兵卒的屯长……公元前209年夏末，一场大雨使得他们无法及时到达目的地。根据秦朝的法律，他们都将被处死。于是他们共谋起义大计。他们谎冒被废的皇太子扶苏的拥护者，通过编造鬼神启示来使他们的行为具有正当性。因此这一起义最初并非直接要反抗朝廷，而仅仅是一帮被严刑峻法逼上绝路的人的负隅之举。

[12] 这首古诗名为《十五从军征》，全诗如下：“十五从军征，八十始得归。道逢乡里人：‘家中有阿谁？’‘遥看是君家，松柏冢累累。’兔从狗窦入，雉从梁上飞；中庭生旅谷，井上生旅葵。舂谷持作饭，采葵持作羹；羹饭一时熟，不知贻阿谁。出门东向看，泪落沾我衣。”引自《中国诗歌》，阿瑟·韦利译，伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1946年，第51页。（参考林庚和冯沅君主编《中国历代诗歌选》［上编］，第1册，人民文学出版社，1983年，第128页。——译者注）

[13] Waley discusses the social situation in which the Legalist school rose to power under the title "The Realists," in The Way and Its Power (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1934), pp. 68–86. The Fa Chia system, in spite of its recognition of the importance of a "rule of law," and its effort toward greater efficiency in government, does not appeal to the Western liberal mind. The Book of Lord Shang, trans. J. J. Duyvendak (London: A. Probsthain, 1928), supposedly the writing of Shang Yang, otherwise known as Wei Yang or Lord Shang, expresses the extreme position of the Legalists. Duyvendak comments: "Law, having been applied theoretically only in order to enforce the observance of the standards set by natural moral law, now became the instrument for enforcing the standard set up by the state. Here came a clash between the law and moral traditions. Never had this idea of law anything to do with the codification of the conceptions of justice living in the hearts of the people; it was merely penal laws and institutions, deemed expedient for the government's centralising and imperialistic purposes; it was the expression of the state's own growing self-consciousness. It is very remarkable that, when we find the necessity for publishing the laws urged, it is not, as elsewhere, an expression of the popular wish to safeguard the people's rights and privileges for the future; on the contrary, it is government itself that desires their publication as a safeguard of its own power, as it expects that the laws will be better observed if people know exactly what punishments and non-observances will entail. Consequently, to have a deterrent effect, the laws have to be severe" (p. 81).

[14] But, according to Fung Yu-lan, the highest ideal of the Legalist school actually was that "ruler and minister, superior and inferior, noble and humble, all obey the law." Fung quotes from Han Fei-tzu, a leading Legalist: "Therefore, the intelligent ruler carries out his regulations as would Heaven and employs men as if he were a spirit. Being like Heaven, he commits no wrong, and being like a spirit, he falls into no difficulties. His shih (power) enforces his strict teachings, and nothing that he encounters resists him." Fung interprets this passage as follows: "By comparing the ruler with Heaven, Han Fei-tzu means that he acts only according to the law, fairly and impartially. That he employs men 'as if he were a spirit' means that he makes use of them according to this "method' or shu, secretly and unfathomably." The gulf between this conception of law and the conception held in the West may be one reason why the ideal of "Great Good Government" has, as Fung says, "never yet actually been attained in China" (Fang Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde [Peiping: H. Vetch, 1937], I, 320–322).

[15] 韦利在《道及其力量》一书中以“实在论者”为题讨论了法家学派执掌权力的社会背景（伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1934年，第68—86页）。尽管法家的制度认识到了“法治”的重要性，并且努力使政府的运作更具效率，但这对西方倡导自由主义者来说并不具吸引力。戴闻达翻译的《商君书》英文版（伦敦：阿瑟·普罗赛因出版公司，1928年）一书，据说是由商鞅（又称卫鞅、商君）所写，它表达了法家的极端的观点。戴闻达评论道：“仅仅是为了强制人们遵守由自然道德律所建立的标准，并要在理论上贯彻的那种法律，现在则成了实施由国家所建立的标准的工具。这里就出现了法律与道德传统之间的撞击。这种法律观念与人们心中正义观念的法典化从来毫无关系，它仅仅是一种刑法和制度，并被看作是政府的中央集权和帝国统治的权宜之计而已。这是国家自己日益成长的自我意识的表达。显而易见的是，当我们发现有要颁布法律的愿望的时候，与别处不同的是，这并非是一种未来要保护人民权利和利益的民间愿望的表达；正相反，这恰恰是政府自己想要保护它自己的权力而想着要颁布法律，因为政府期望如果人民对违反法律所必须承担的惩罚有准确的了解，就会更好地遵守法律；因此，为了达到其威慑性，法律必须极为严苛。”（第81页）

[16] 照冯友兰的看法，法家的最高理想实际上是“君臣上下贵贱皆从法”。冯友兰引述著名的法家人物韩非子的话说：“故明主之行制也天，其用人也鬼。天则不非，鬼则不困，势行教严，逆而不违。”冯友兰对这一段文字有如下的解释：“‘明主之行制也天’，言其依法而行，公而无私也。‘其用人也鬼’，言其御人有术，密而不可测也。”这种法律观念与西方法律观念之间的沟壑可能就是为什么像冯友兰所说的“大治”“在中国历史中盖未尝实现”的一个原因。引自《中国哲学史》英文版，冯友兰著，德克·卜德译，北平：亨利·维奇出版公司，1937年，第1卷，第320—322页。［中文版参见冯友兰《中国哲学史》（上册），中华书局，1961年，第391—392页。——译者注］

[17] Even in this case the punishment was only indirect. "Then, the Crown Prince infringed the law. Wei Yang said: 'It is owing to the infringements by the highly-placed, that the law is not carried out. We shall apply the law to the Crown Prince; as, however, he is Your Highness's Heir, we cannot subject him to capital punishment. Let his tutor, Prince Ch'ien, be punished and his teacher, Kung-sun Chia, be branded' ” (Introduction to The Book of Lord Shang, p. 16).

[18] "We have an ancient saying that if the dragon left its water and the tiger left the mountains, even they would be insulted. Take those officers in the imperial court, they take in all sorts of humiliations and never dare protest; but when they reach their homes, they scold and beat their children and wife to give vent to their angers. Yet the officers dare not resign, just like the tigers dare not leave the mountains and the dragons the waters" (Liu Ê, A Tramp Doctor's Travelogue: A Story Laid in the Manchu Regime, trans. Lin Yi-chin and Ko Te-chun [Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1939], p. 114).

[19] 即使在这种情况下，惩罚也仅仅是间接的。“于是太子犯法。卫鞅曰：‘法之不行，自上犯之。’将法太子。太子，君嗣也，不可施刑，刑其傅公子虔，黥其师公孙贾。”引自《商君书》英文版“导论”，第16页。

[20] “所以古人说：龙若离水，虎若离山，便要受人狎侮的。即如朝廷里做官的人，无论为了甚么难，受了甚么气，只是回家来对着老婆孩子发发标，在外边决不敢发半句硬话，也是不敢离了那个官。同那虎不敢去山，龙不敢失水的道理，是一样的。”引自《老残游记》英文版，刘鹗著，林疑今、葛德顺译，上海：商务印书馆，1939年，第114页。

[21] "A poetic expression dating back to the Ming dynasty when Yu Ch'ien as a provincial official refused to follow the custom of handing out gifts exacted without payment from the populace to the dignitaries of the imperial court but instead presented himself empty-handed. The term has come to refer to officials who hold office and retire without having enriched themselves. In spite of pressures and practices to the contrary, this type of official has always been an ideal of Confucian teaching…. The China of the nineteenth century still kept green the memory of past officials who had been incorruptible. Their names were household words; stories about them had been treasured for centuries. Thus, the Ancestral Hall of the Yang family was still called the Hall of the Four Knows because of what had happened there seven centuries earlier. In A.D. 112, when a friend remonstrated with Yang Chen for leaving nothing to his sons, he replied: 'If posterity speaks of me as an incorruptible official, will that be nothing?' And when a man offered him a bribe and said: 'It is after dark and no one will know,' Yang Chen was recorded as saying: 'Not know? Why, Heaven will know, Earth will know, you will know, I will know.' There was a later Yang, Yang Ch'eng, who lived a thousand years before the time of Tao Kuang. Ordered to collect taxes during the famine, he refused, and threw himself into prison where he slept on a plank. Many other old stories of official rectitude were current" (Maurice Collis, Foreign Mud [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947], p. 95).

[22] "T'ao, who lived in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., was our poet of nature par excellence. Once he served as a district magistrate. When he could not longer stand the ordeal of formality he burst out upon the occasion of the arrival of the provincial inspector, his superior, 'I cannot bow to a mean fellow from the street just for five pecks of rice.' So saying, he left his official hat hanging on the wall and went right home" (C. W. Luh, On Chinese Poetry [Peiping, 1935], p. 16).

"What folly to spend one's life like a dropped leaf

Snared under the dust of streets,

But for thirty years it was so I lived.

…

There is no dust or clatter

In the courtyard before my house.

My private rooms are quiet,

And calm with the leisure of moonlight through an open door.

For a long time I lived in a cage;

Now I have returned.

For one must return

To fulfill one's nature."

("Once More Fields and Gardens," by T'ao Yuan-ming, in Fir-Flower Tablets, translated from the Chinese by Florence Ayscough, English versions by Amy Lowell [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930], p. 133.)

[23] In "The Old Man with the Broken Arm (A Satire on Militarism)," ca. A.D. 809, by Po Chü-i, we read:

"Everyone says that in expeditions against the Man tribes

Of a million men who are sent out, not one returns.

I, that am old, was then twenty-four;

My name and fore-name were written down in the rolls of the Board of War.

In the depth of the night not daring to let anyone know,

I secretly took a huge stone and dashed it against my arm.

For drawing the bow and waving the banner now wholly unfit,

I knew henceforward I should not be sent to fight in Yun-nan.

Bones broken and sinews wounded could not fail to hurt;

My plan was to be rejected and sent back to my home.

My arm—broken ever since; it was sixty years ago.

One limb, although destroyed—whole body safe!

But even now on winter nights when the wind and rains blow

From evening on till day's dawn I cannot sleep for pain.

Not sleeping for pain

Is a small thing to bear,

Compared with the joy of being alive when all the rest are dead.

For otherwise, years ago, at the ford of Lu River

My body would have died and my soul hovered by the bones that no one gathered.

A ghost, I'd have wandered in Yun-nan, always looking for home.

Over the graves of ten thousand soldiers, mournfully hovering."

(From Chinese Poems, trans. Arthur Waley, pp. 129–131.)

[24] “这一诗意的表达要回溯到明朝的时候，作为省级官员的于谦拒绝同流合污，搜刮老百姓来给朝廷中的达官显贵送礼，而是两手空空前去。这一成语指的是官僚们身居官位及至退休的时候并没有使自己发财致富。尽管有来自反面的压力和做法，这种类型的官员一直是儒家教育推崇的理想典范……19世纪的中国还牢牢记着过去的一身廉洁的官员们。他们的名字家喻户晓，有关他们的故事被世代铭记珍视。因此，杨姓堂号仍旧被称作‘四知堂’，源于七个世纪以前发生的一桩逸事。在公元112年，当一位朋友指责杨震没有给他的儿子们留下任何东西时，他就回答说：‘如果子孙后代把我说成是一位清官的话，那不应该说是什么都没留下吧？’有人向他行贿时说：‘现在天色已晚，不会有人知道。’据记载杨震当时说：‘为什么没有人知道？天知、地知、你知、我知。’后来还出了个阳城，他的生活年代要早于道光朝一千多年［实际为唐代，不到一千年；见《新唐书·列传第一百一十九》——编者注］。皇帝命令他在饥荒的年代去收税，他拒绝了，并自囚于狱中，睡在狱中的一块木板上面。其他许多正直官员仗义执言的古老故事都流传至今。”引自《外来的泥土》，莫里斯·科利斯著，纽约：艾尔弗雷德·克诺夫出版公司，1947年，第95页。

[25] “陶渊明生活在公元4世纪—5世纪，他是一位优秀的崇尚自然的诗人。他曾经做过县令，但无法忍受繁文缛节的束缚。当他的上级郡监察官来巡察的时候，他的情绪一下子爆发出来，他说：‘吾不能为五斗米折腰，拳拳事乡里小人邪！’说完这样的话之后，他便挂冠归隐。”引自陆志韦著，《中国诗五讲》英文版（英文书名应为Five Lectures on Chinese Poetry——编者注），1935年，第16页。

“误落尘网中，一去三十年。……户庭无尘杂，虚室有余闲。久在樊笼里，复得返自然。”引自陶渊明诗《归园田居》，载于埃米·洛厄尔、弗洛伦丝·艾斯库合译诗集《松花笺》，波士顿：霍顿·米夫林出版集团，1930年，第133页。（可参见林庚和冯沅君主编《中国历代诗歌选》［上编］，人民文学出版社，1983年，第128页。——译者注）

[26] 白居易于公元809年在《新丰折臂翁》这首诗中写道：“皆云前后征蛮者，千万人行无一回。是时翁年二十四，兵部牒中有名字。夜深不敢使人知，偷将大石槌折臂。张弓簸旗俱不堪，从兹始免征云南。骨碎筋伤非不苦，且图拣退归乡土。此臂折来六十年，一肢虽废一身全。至今风雨阴寒夜，直到天明痛不眠。痛不眠，终不悔，且喜老身今独在。不然当时泸水头，身死魂孤骨不收。应作云南望乡鬼，万人冢上哭呦呦。”引自《中国诗歌》，韦利译，第129—131页。（中文参见《白居易诗译析》，霍松林著，黑龙江人民出版社，1981年，第152—153页。——译者注）

[27] Po Chü-i thus congratulates himself on the comforts of his life after his retirement from office:

"Lined coat, warm cap and easy felt slippers,

In the little tower, at the low window, sitting over the sunken brazier.

Body at rest, heart at peace; no need to rise early.

I wonder if the courtiers at the Western Capital know of these things or not?"

(From A Hundred and Seventy Chinese Poems, trans. Arthur Waley [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1919], p. 239.)

[28] 白居易曾作诗来形容他辞官还乡后的舒适生活，诗中写道：“重裘暖帽宽毡履，小阁低窗深地炉。身稳心安眠未起，西京朝士得知无。”引自《中国诗歌170首》，韦利译，纽约：艾尔弗雷德·克诺夫出版公司，1919年，第239页。