Chapter Four Basic Power Structure in Rural China

第肆章 中国乡村的基本权力结构

● THE DO-NOTHING POLICY OF THE IMPERIAL POWER

A centralized political system has had a long history in China. Since the time (221 B.C.) when the First Emperor abolished feudalism and created the provinces and districts, local officials theoretically have always been appointed by the central government, the custom being that local men should not be named as local officials. It would appear from this that the Chinese political system was one controlled completely from the top, one in which the people were entirely passive and in which local interests had no voice. If this had been really true, the Chinese political system would have been the most authoritarian known to man. Yet it is obvious that, unless the people were completely enslaved, a centralized control of this sort would be very difficult to maintain, particularly in a huge country in which the system of communications was not comparable to that of the Roman Empire, for example, and which was without many strong garrisons. Any political regime which wishes to maintain itself for long, if it cannot win the active support of the people, must at least gain their tolerance. In other words, the political system cannot be developed on a single track from the top downward. Under any kind of political rule the people's opinion cannot entirely be ignored. This means that there must be, in some way, a parallel track from the bottom up. A sound system which will endure must thus be "double track." This is clearly seen in modern democratic institutions, but in fact it may also be traced in the so-called absolutistic governments. When under this sort of rule the track from the bottom up is broken, we have a tyrant, and the result is disaster. The fact that in China, even under the absolutistic system, despotic tyrants have not always ruled indicates that there has been some informal type of track by means of which the people's opinion has penetrated to the top levels.

In the Chinese traditional political system there have been two lines of defense which prevented an absolute monarchy from becoming intolerably tyrannical. The first defense was Chinese political philosophy, the theory of do-nothingness. Years of experience shaped this. In Chinese history there has been little theory or practice to encourage political power to interfere with the social life of the people. It is true that the realistic and materialistic Legalistic Han Fei-tzu (ca. 280–233 B.C.) did advocate reforms in the government to strengthen it and to make the nation rich. He and his followers worked out the Legalist theory of rule by law. But in the eyes of traditional scholars throughout Chinese history, Han Fei-tzu has been poorly regarded, and his tragic end[1] has been pointed out as a warning to those who would have liked to follow the same path. Two other well-known reformers, Wang Mang in the Han dynasty (who usurped the throne A.D. 9–23), and Wang An-shih (1021–1086) in the Sung dynasty, wished the government to carry out social reforms and were against the do-nothing policy. But both failed. It may be said by those who sympathized with them that they were prevented by reactionaries from attaining their goals. And yet none of these reformers went so far as to attempt to restrict the monarchical power by law. Nor did any of them make any effort to learn whether their reforms would be acceptable to the people either in whole or in part. In fact, there was no evidence that the policy they urged upon the government, coincided in any way with the people's desires.[2] The policy of maintaining the monarchical power unrestricted and enforcing the government's will upon the people naturally resulted in conflict with the latter. In the political history of the West the tendency has been increasingly to give up the responsibility for, and control of, political power to the people. In China political policy throughout the ages has been rather to neutralize political power in such a way that the people did not become restless (while the few would-be reformers of this system have tended toward more authoritarianism than those whom they opposed). Do-nothingism is a way of dealing with political problems which is different from the positive check of a constitutional government but which serves as the "first defense" against political absolutism.[3]

● 皇权的无为政策

中央集权制度在中国有着漫长的历史。自公元前221年秦始皇废封建、置郡县以来，原则上地方官吏都由中央政府来任命，当地人通常不能在当地为官。以此看来，似乎中国的政治体制是完全受上面控制的，人民是完全被动的，地方利益无法保障。如果确是这样，那中国的政治体制也成了最专制的方式。但显而易见的是，如果人民不被完全奴役，这种集权统治就很难维持，尤其在这样一个交通系统无法与比如罗马帝国相比且缺乏足够牢固要塞的大国。任何想长久维持的政权，如果不能赢得人民积极的支持，至少也要得到他们的容忍。换句话说，政治体制不能简单地沿着自上而下的轨道运行，在任何政治统治下，人民的意见都不能完全被忽视。这就意味着，在某种方式上，必须要有自下而上的一个平行轨道。因此，一个可以长时间维持的良好的体制将是“双重轨道”，这在现代民主制度下显而易见，在专制政治的实际运行中也是如此。在这种统治下，当自下而上的轨道被破坏时，就有了暴君，于是悲剧就发生了。事实是，在中国，即使在专制统治下，也并不完全是暴君统治，这一事实表明人民的意见通过某种非正式的轨道向上传达。

在中国传统政治体制下，有两道防线使专制的皇帝不致过于暴虐。第一道防线是中国政治哲学——无为主义，这是从长年的经验里累积而成。在中国历史上，很少有理论或实践鼓励政权去干扰人民的社会生活。主张现实主义和唯物主义的法家代表人物韩非子（约公元前280年—公元前233年）确实曾倡议改革来加强政府统治、富裕国家。他和他的追随者提出了法治的法家学说。但是在中国历史上传统学者的眼里，韩非子并未受到尊重，他悲惨的结局[4]被认为是给想要重蹈其覆辙者敲响了警钟。另外两位知名的改革者是汉代的王莽（他在公元9年—23年篡夺了皇位）和宋代的王安石（1021—1086），他们希望政府实行社会改革，反对无为政策。但两人都失败了。那些同情他们的人可以说，是反动分子的阻挠使他们未能如愿。但是，没有一位改革者胆敢以法来限制皇权，也没有改革者花费精力来研究，他们的改革是否完全或部分地被人民所接受。其实，没有证据显示，他们推行的政策是否符合人们的意愿。[5]维护皇权的无限制性和加强政府对人民的控制就自然导致了与后者的冲突。西洋的政治史是加强对权力的控制，使它逐渐向民意负责。而在中国长时间以来的政治政策是软禁权力，以使人民不会感到不安（那些在此种体制下的少数未来改革者们比他们与之对着干的那些人更倾向于威权主义）。无为主义是一种解决政治问题的方法。这一方法与宪法政府的积极制约不同，但却是针对政治专制主义的“第一道防线”。[6]

We recognize now that such a system is not effective in modern life, since we depend upon central governmental power to take action with regard to those things which concern the people as a whole. But in economically self-sufficient communities it is not necessary to employ authority beyond that found in the local community. Constitutional government is a modern achievement. Before it developed in the West, political power was there as elsewhere restricted by traditional morality, in this case reinforced by the supernatural authority of the church.[7] And we may note that the American constitution, which was drafted before industrial development had taken place, had the point of view that the best government is the one which governs least. In China, men had recourse not to legal but to ideological restrictions upon the absolute power of the monarch. It was probably due to the influence of Confucian ideology that the abuse of political power was to some extent lessened.

现在，我们意识到这种制度在现代生活中不起什么作用，因为在面临与全体人民密切相关的事务时，我们依靠中央政府采取措施。但是在经济自给自足的社会中，没有必要再动用除地方权力机构之外的其他权力。宪法政府是现代的成就。它在西方发展之前，那里的政治权力如同其他任何地方一样，受到传统道德的约束，在西方即得到教会超自然权威的强化。[8]而且我们会注意到，在工业发展之前起草的美国宪法认为，“最少管事的政府是最好的政府”。在中国，人们不求助于法律，而是寄望于对绝对皇权的意识形态上的制约。可能正是受儒家意识形态的影响，在某种程度上政府权力的滥用才有所减轻。

● THE POLITICAL TRACK FROM THE BOTTOM UP

In this section I do not wish to emphasize the first line of defense, however, but rather the second. In our traditional politics, on the one hand, we restricted political power by ideology and, on the other, restricted the sphere of the administrative system. We somehow managed to "hang up" the centralized power so that it did not reach to the ground, since the officials sent by the central government stopped at the district yamen. Ordinarily, students of Chinese administration have paid little attention to the connection between the hsien (district) government and the gate of each house. But, in fact, this connection was both extremely interesting and important in that it was the meeting point of the powerful central authorities and the local self-governing community. Only by understanding this meeting point can we know how the Chinese traditional system actually worked.

Let us start with the district yamen. I have said that the officials sent by the central government stopped at the district because, formerly, we did not recognize any political unit below the hsien. The head of the hsien, who represented the emperor, was called the "parent-official," or fu-mu kuan. He was supposed to maintain an intimate relationship with the people, but, in fact, the office of this lao-yeh was as high as the sky—so high, indeed, that no ordinary person could reach up to it. Nor was the yamen a place in which any common person could enter freely. But between the parent-officials and the children-common people existed intermediaries. Those who made the actual contact between the yamen and the people, the ruler and the ruled, were the servants of the officials. These official servants (ya-i) occupied one of the lowest positions in the Chinese social scale; they were deprived of most of their civil rights, and their sons were not allowed to take the examinations. It is a significant point in the Chinese power structure that these men who were in the position of most easily abused power should have been held so low. If society had not suppressed them by despising them and depriving them of a decent social position, they might have become as fearful as wolves. But with no hope of ascending in the social scale, even if they abused their power, they still would not be too formidable.[9]

Under a political system that upholds the do-nothing policy, the local officials will have very little work. So history shows us many officials spending much of their time in leisurely expeditions or in developing their literary talents. Their job was merely to collect taxes and to act as judges.

● 由下而上的政治轨道

不过，这一节将强调第二道防线上的权力制约，而不是第一道防线。在我们传统的政治生活中，一方面我们用思想约束政治权力，另一方面又去限制行政体系的范围。这是把集权的中央悬空起来，不使它进入与人民日常生活相关的地方公益范围之中。中央派遣的官员到县级为止，不再下去了。一般研究传统中国行政机构的人很少注意到从县衙门到每家大门之间的一段情形，其实这一段是最有趣的，同时也是最重要的，因为这是强大的中央政权与自治的社区之间的结合点。只有对这个结合点有很好的了解，我们才能理解中国的传统体制实际是如何运作的。

我们先从衙门说起。我谈到由中央派遣的官员只存在于县级以上，因为以前在县级以下我们不认可政府部门的存在。知县代表着皇帝，被称为“父母官”，他应与群众保持亲密关系，但这位老爷的衙门像天一样高得让普通老百姓难以接近。衙门也不是一般人都能随便进入的。但是，在父母官和其子民之间有着一些往来接头的人。那些保持衙门与民众之间、治人者与治于人者之间联系的人是官僚的奴仆们。这些衙役在中国的社会中居于最低的阶层之中，他们被剥夺了大多数的公权，他们的儿子不得参加科举考试。最容易滥用权力的人被置于如此低的地位，这也是中国权力体系中十分重要的一点。如果社会没有通过轻视他们、剥夺他们优越的社会地位的方式压制他们的话，他们可能就会像犬狼一样可怕。在没有提高社会地位可能的情况下，即使他们滥用权力，他们仍然不至过于令人惧怕。[10]

在倡导无为政策的政治体制中，地方官没有什么工作可做。所以，从历史上我们可以了解到许多在这种职务任内花大把时间游山玩水或培育自身文学才能的例子。他们的工作只是收税和断案。

So far as the latter occupation went, there was not much to do, because the ideal was to have no litigation. The duty of governmental servants was to keep order among the people, to collect money, and to conscript labor when needed. If the district ordinances had applied to each and every household, it would have meant that the hsien was actually a basic unit of administration. But in fact this was not true. District orders did not come to the various households but to the local self-governing unit (called, in Yunnan, the "public family," or kung-chia). I speak of this type of organization as a "self-governing unit" because it was organized by local people to look out for the public affairs of the community. Public affairs included problems of irrigation, self-defense, mediation in personal disputes, mutual aid, recreation, and religious activities. In China such things are local community affairs, and, according to the tradition still preserved, they are not an affair of government but are managed by the local community under the leadership of the better-educated and wealthier family heads. Practical affairs such as might come up in dealing with irrigation, for example, might be dealt with by nonscholarly responsible individuals; but the more scholarly would generally have greater prestige in the making of decisions.[11]

But besides deciding local public affairs, another important function of the kung-chia was to represent the people in their dealings with the government. With good reason I have separated these two functions—the self-governing and the dealing with the central government. The responsible leaders of the kung-chia organization kept clear of any official dealings with the yamen. Instead, there were special individuals who represented the community in their dealings with the government. These people were called shang-yao (the term used locally in Yunnan). As I said before, in the de jure political system, there was no recognized track from the bottom up, the emperor being absolute. To reject an order of the emperor thus was a crime. Nevertheless, the fact that the emperor had ordered it was not in real life a guaranty that the people would accept it. Therefore, in actual practice, there had to be a means for communicating with the people and discovering their sentiments. The servant of the government brought the orders not to the kung-chia but to the shang-yao. The shang-yao, whose office was filled in turn by members of the community, was in a particularly awkward spot because he had no real power or influence in the community but merely served as the terminus of the track from the top down. After he had received an order from the government, he in turn reported to the head of the kung-chia. The latter then talked the matter over with other leaders of the gentry in the teashop, and if he, along with the others, decided that the order was unacceptable, he rejected it and turned it back to the shang-yao. This unfortunate in turn must again communicate with the yamen and receive the brunt of official annoyance due to his lack of success. But in this way the "face" of the emperor would have been saved, since the refusal to comply was not direct but merely indicated in a roundabout fashion. Meanwhile, informal negotiations would be carried on. The leaders of the local community, whose status as gentry placed them on a footing of equality with officialdom, would make a friendly call upon the district official in the course of which they discussed the governmental order. If no agreement resulted from these negotiations of local gentry and local government officials, the local gentry would be inclined to get their friends and relatives in town to take the matter up with the higher levels of the bureaucracy, in time, perhaps, working up to the very top. Eventually, an agreement of some sort would be reached, the central government would change its order, and things would settle down again.

就是第二项工作也没有多少事，他们的准则是最好没有诉讼。政府工作人员的任务是维持人们的正常秩序、收钱以及在需要时征集劳力。如果县政府的命令下达到每个家庭，那才真正意味着县是一个基本的行政单位。但事实并非如此。县的命令并不直接到达各家各户，而是发到地方的自治团体（在云南被称为是“公家”的那一类组织）。我称这一组织为“自治团体”，因为它是由当地人民组织以管理社区公共事务，如水利、自卫、调解、互助、娱乐、宗教等。在中国，这些是地方的公务，在依旧活着的传统里，它们并非政府的事务，而是以受到过良好教育、较为富裕家庭的家长为首，由地方社区来管理的。像灌溉这样的实务，可能由没有学问的人来负责，但有学问的人通常在作决定方面有更高的声望。[12]

但是，除处理地方上的公共事务之外，公家另外一个重要的作用就是在与政府打交道时代表人民。我有足够的理由将此二种功能——自治与代表政府——分离开来。公家负责人不沾手与衙门发生的官方关系，而是有特定人物代表社区与政府打交道，这些人被称为“乡约”（此为云南土语）。如我所言，在法定的政治体系中，并不承认自下而上的轨道，皇帝是绝对的，因此违背皇帝的旨意就是犯罪。但是在实际生活中，谁也不敢保证自上而下的命令一定是人民乐于接受的。因此，在实际的运作中，必须有与人们交流以及了解他们的意愿的途径。官府的衙役并不是把命令传达到公家，而是传达到乡约那里。乡约由社区成员轮流担任，其身份尤其尴尬，因为他在社区没有实权或影响，只不过是权力从上至下轨道的终点。他在接到政府命令后，相应地向公家的管事汇报，后者在茶馆里与士绅中的其他头面人物商讨，如果他与其他管事觉得命令难以接受，他可以拒绝并退回给乡约。这倒霉的乡约必须再次通报衙门，并且由于办事不力，还会成为官家的“出气筒”。不过，这样皇帝的“脸面”就保住了，因为这种违抗并非是直接的，而仅仅是以一种迂回的方式来表明。另一方面，非正式的协商也开始了。地方的管事以其与官位相当的士绅地位去拜会地方官，就政府指令一事进行协商。如果达不成协议，地方的管事就会委托镇上的亲戚朋友，再往上层活动，到地方官上司那里去交涉，有时可能会上至最高当局。最后某种协议达成了，中央政府就会自行修改命令，事情再次得到解决。

According to this system, the local leader did not come into contact with the despised governmental petty servants. If the self-governing unit had been an actual part of the de jure administration, however, the track from the bottom up would have been blocked. The official in charge of the yamen could not have a free discussion with subordinates in office but only with those outside the bureaucracy and his social equals. In the Ch'ing dynasty (1644–1911) a man who had passed the district examination could call on the local official, using his own card. Besides this privilege of a scholar, he was also protected from corporal punishment, unless his degree were first taken away. And this latter act was in the power not of the district official but only of the local education official. Such people who were able to deal with the governmental officials are those who were called gentry.

I hope I have made certain points clear in this somewhat simplified account. (1) In the traditional Chinese power structure there were two different layers: on the top, the central government; at the bottom, the local governing unit whose leaders were the gentry class. (2) There was a de facto limit to the authority of the central government. Local affairs, managed in the community by the gentry, were hardly interfered with by the central authorities. (3) Legally there was only one track—from the top down—along which passed imperial orders. But in actual practice, by the use of intermediaries such as the government servants and a locally chosen shang-yao or functionary of the same type, unreasonable orders might be turned back. This influence from the bottom up is not usually recognized in discussions of the formal governmental institutions of China, but it was effective nevertheless. (4) The mechanism of bringing influences to bear from the bottom upward was worked through the informal pressure of the gentry upon their relatives in office and out or upon friends who had taken the same examinations. By this means influence could be brought to bear sometimes even upon the emperor himself. (5) The self-governing organization so called arose from the practical needs of the community. The power of this group was not derived from the central imperial power but came from the local people themselves. When the central authority collected only a limited amount of taxes and of conscripts, the people would be likely to feel that "Heaven is high, the emperor is far away." But the necessity for maintaining some contact between centralized and local authorities meant that the local gentry always tended to have strategic and leading positions in the local organization."[13]

依照这种体制，地方管事不与被鄙视、不起眼的政府差人接头，因为如果自治团体成了法定行政机构里的一级，从下到上的轨道就被阻塞了。负责衙门的官员不能与属下胥吏自由交谈，只可与官僚体制之外的人或与他社会地位相仿的人讨论。在清代（1644—1911），中举的人可以用自己的帖子拜会地方官员。除了这种文人的特权外，除非他的头衔被取消，他还可以免受皮肉之刑。举人的功名县官无权取消，而只有地方教育官员才有此权力。那些可以与政府官员打交道的人被称作士绅。

我希望我已经在上述有些简短的叙述中阐明了几点：（1）在中国传统的权力体系中存在两个层次——上层有中央政府，下层有以士绅阶层作为管事的自治团体。（2）中央政府的权威事实上是受限的。由士绅管理的地方事务一般不受中央权威的干扰。（3）从法律上来讲，只有一条自上而下的传达皇帝命令的途径。但是在实际运作中，不合理的命令可以通过官府衙役、地方选择的乡约或其他此类的媒介人物而被打回。在讨论中国正式的政府制度时，通常没有认识到这种自下而上的影响，但无论如何它是有效力的。（4）自下而上传递影响的机制是由士绅的从政或不从政的亲属或参加同批考试的朋友的非正式压力来实现的。通过这种方式，影响甚至可以直达皇帝本人那里。（5）所谓的自治团体是由当地人民实际需要中产生的，而且享受着地方人民所授予的权力，不受中央干涉。当中央政权只征收一部分有限的赋税和劳役时，当地百姓可能会有“天高皇帝远”的感觉。但是保持中央和地方政府之间联系的重要性意味着，士绅通常会在当地组织中拥有决策和管事的地位。[14]

● THE BREAKDOWN OF THE LOCAL SELF-GOVERNING GROUP

In describing the power structure above, the term "inefficiency" was not derogatory. Actually the need for efficiency did not arise, in that the affairs which directly concerned the people were carried on outside the formal government. The work of local self-governing groups followed local needs and conformed to local attitudes. Occasionally, the local organization attempted to regulate life in minute detail. For example, in a certain village in Yunnan, if a married couple did not produce children, they would be symbolically beaten and even fined a small amount. Traditional and religious actions were maintained by the local organization. Thus, a do-nothing emperor might enjoy high peace and order under the heavens during his reign because the local organizations throughout the country kept things going. Since the imperial power demanded only two things—taxes and conscripts from the people—the existence of inefficient, poetry-writing officials was, in a sense, a blessing. But such a system could work only in an economy which was to a high degree self-sufficient. When intervillage affairs developed, such as large-scale irrigation or other public works projects, or warfare was initiated, an inefficient centralized government was a bad thing. This point is easy to see. The development of Chinese economy increased the work of the central government. Theoretically, no changes were needed in the government itself, since we already had a highly developed centralized political system; we required only more efficiency in its working. It is true that since, legally, the power of the central government was unlimited, increasing its efficiency might break down the first line of defense against a tyrannical authority. But since the do-nothing policy was, after all, a very negative means of restricting power, a means indeed which could hardly be maintained in a modern society, its decline could hardly be regretted. The damage which occurred to the second line of defense, the highly developed local self-government system, when the supposedly more efficient pao-chia system was introduced (or, rather reintroduced) was another matter, however.

● 地方自治团体的崩溃

在上文对权力结构的描述中，“无能”不是个恶名。实际上，并没有出现对“效率”的要求，因为与人民利益直接相关的事务在正式的政府之外得到执行。地方自治团体迎合当地需要，满足地方上的要求。偶尔，地方政府也试图管理琐碎小事。比如，在云南有一个村庄，如果已婚夫妇没有生育，他们会受到象征性的责打，甚至还要被少量罚款。地方自治组织还管理传统的宗教性活动。因此，皇帝无为而能天下治的原因是有着无数这类地方团体到处在勤修民政。既然皇权只向人民索要赋税和劳力这两样东西，效率低下、舞文弄墨的官员的存在从一定意义上说也是人民的一种福气。但这种机制只有在一个高度自给自足的经济中才行得通。当有村际事务，像大型灌溉或其他公共项目或公益事务启动以及出现战事时，无能的中央政府就成了一件坏事。这一点容易看出来。中国经济的发展使中央政府的工作增加。理论上讲，政府本身没有改变的必要，因为我们已经有一个高度发展的中央集权的政治体制。我们只需要有更高的工作效率。从法律上来讲，中央政府的权力可以大到无限，因此提高政府效率确实可能破坏防止权力被滥用的第一道防线。不过，对于无为主义的防线的溃决，我们不必加以惋惜，毕竟，这本是十分消极的限制权力的办法，几乎不适用于现代社会。但当效率更高的保甲制度引入进来（或者说重新引入）之后，对第二条防线的破坏，即对高度发展的地方自治机制的破坏，就是另一回事了。

The pao-chia system[15] has brought the political track from the top down to the gate of every household and, in fact, as a state of policing, has even entered every house door. The introduction of the pao-chia system was for reason. In the old traditional system governmental administration was handicapped by its lack of thoroughness, the fact that it only went halfway in carrying out orders. It seemed it would be much more efficient for the government to deal directly with the people instead of having to have everything pass through the local organization. Moreover, when the pao-chia system came into force in the 1930’s, it was intended that it should, in time, take up the function of self-government, so that, as the recognized track from the bottom up, there might be built up a system of really democratic representation. But the latter result has never been realized. The pao-chia system has certain defects which make it unsuited to a democratic system of representation. According to pao-chia, the people were to be organized, with slight variations, in uniform numerical groups. But such units did not necessarily coincide with actual social groups. The size of a community is determined by historical and social forces; we cannot add members to a family or to a local community and have them fit in. By instituting the principle of uniformity in the pao-chia system—this was actually worked out only for convenience in administration and especially for dealing with conscription—the principle of local self-government has been weakened. Often a community will be divided into several chia, while several unrelated units may be combined in one pao, the result being much confusion. In fact, there now came into existence two overlapping systems: one, the pao-chia, imposed from the top; the other, the natural local organization, which had now become illegal, and these two systems tended to come into conflict.

保甲制度[16]是把自上而下的政治轨道筑到每家的门前，实际上是把国家的警察制度这条轨道延长到了各家门内。保甲制度有它推行的原因。在旧的传统制度中，政府管理缺乏彻底性，政令执行半途而废，自上而下的轨道因而受阻。似乎政府直接与人民打交道比事事经当地组织效率要高得多。另外，当保甲制度在20世纪30年代得到实行的时候，人们期望它迟早能够起到自治政府的作用，以便在这一公认的基层上行轨道上可以建立真正的民主代表体制。然而，后一结果从未得以实现。保甲制度有一些缺点使其不适于一种代表制的民主制度。在保甲制度下，人们被组织成略有差别的按数目统一排列的群体单位。但是，这些单位并不与实际存在的社会群体等同。社区的规模是由历史和社会力量决定的；我们不能人为地向一个家庭或社区增加成员并使其成为其中的一员。通过推行保甲制度的统一性——这只是为了管理上的方便，特别是管理征募事务——地方自治的原则被弱化。通常一个社区被分成许多“甲”，几个互不联系的单位又被合并为一个“保”，其结果是一片混乱。实际上是存在着两个重叠的体制：一是上面强制实行的保甲制度，另一个是现属非法的自然形成的地方组织；这两者之间很容易发生冲突。

● TEARING UP THE DOUBLE TRACK

The first serious problem over which conflict developed was the selecting of the head of the pao-chia, the pao-tsun. The pao-chia was an administrative system which executed orders from above, but at the same time it was the legally recognized organization for directing local public affairs. Under the traditional system the carrying-out of this double function was shared by three different groups: the servants of the government; the shang-yao, or local representative and intermediary; and the leaders among the local gentry. Now that these three were all combined in one man, the pao-tsun, it was assumed that the orders of the central government would be accepted by the people, as always, and carried out by them. But practical difficulties arose at once as the result of the new system. First of all, those people of the community who possessed prestige have usually been unwilling to accept the job of pao-tsun. As local gentry, if they wished to preserve their equal status with officialdom, they could not accept a place in the system which would make them lower in status and unable to negotiate but only to accept orders from those above. As a mediator, in fact, the function of the pao-tsun was only equivalent to that of a shang-yao. Yet the pao-tsun and the shang-yao are actually not at all the same. The shang-yao has no power, while the pao-tsun is legally upon the same level as the local leaders, with the right to keep the public funds and to manage local affairs. The difficulty is that the functions of mediator and of administrator have become confused. An energetic pao-tsun is likely to come into conflict with the local gentry, and in this conflict there will be no longer any bridge between governmental and local interests. A local leader of the gentry who accepts the post of pao-tsun as being in his own interest and a position of authority will find that actually his situation has changed for the worse, in that he can no longer reject any order from above. Thus the local community has become a dead end in the political system. The people now have no way to express themselves against the central authority, and, when the situation becomes intolerable, the only way out is to rebel.

The pao-chia system, thus, not only has disrupted the traditional community organization but has also hampered the developing life of the people. It has destroyed the safety valve of the traditional political system. Nor has the new structure of the pao-chia effectively taken over the work of the traditional self-governing organization. The net result has simply been to outlaw the old system so that it can no longer work openly. Deadlock, inefficiency, and even the disruption of the basic administrative machinery have been the results.

● 双轨的拆除

导致冲突的第一个严重问题发生在保甲头领即保长的人选上。保甲是一个执行上级命令的行政机构，同时它也是法律认可的指导地方公共事务的组织。在传统体制下，这两种职能由三种人物分担，他们是衙门里的差人、地方上充当代表和媒介人物的乡约以及地方士绅的领袖管事。当三者集中于保长一人之身时，人们以为中央政府的命令会像以往一样被人们接受并得到执行，但随之新制度即刻出现了实际的问题。首先，社区中有声望的人通常不愿接受保长之职。作为当地乡绅，他们更愿保留与官僚同等的地位，而不愿接受社会地位降低，使其不得与官僚平等磋商而只能接受上级命令的结局。其实，保长作为媒介人物的地位相当于乡约。不过保长和乡约又不完全相同。乡约没有权力，保长与地方官员有同等的权力并可以保留公产及管理当地的事务。问题在于，接头人物和管理人物的职能被人们混淆。工作积极的保长易与当地士绅发生矛盾冲突，而在冲突中政府利益和地方利益之间的桥梁也不复存在。为了自己利益接受保长之职而处于管事地位的乡绅会发现，自己实际上处在一种更不利的境地——他们再难抗拒来自上面的政令。这样，地方社区成为了政治体制的一个死角。人们没有其他途径表示他们对中央政府的不同意见，当情况变得难以忍受时，他们只有起来造反。

因此，保甲制度不仅扰乱了传统的社区组织，而且还阻碍了人们生活的发展。它还破坏了传统政治制度的安全阀。保甲制度这种新的体制也没有有效地替代传统的自治组织。最终的结果是将旧的制度置于法律的保护范围之外，使其不能公开活动。僵持、低效甚至对基本管理机制的破坏就是由此而带来的后果。

The extension of the track from the top down was intended to facilitate the execution of governmental orders. Though it is true that through the pao-chia system a more centralized administration has been realized, greater efficiency has resulted in form only, since, when there is a deadlock at the bottom, orders tend not to be carried out actually. In the more efficient collection of taxes and of conscripts, the new system has achieved something, it is true. But in all projects of local reconstruction or increase of production, all that is accomplished is the placing of the orders in the files of the pao-chia. In fact, it has become generally accepted that this storing of documents is one of the main functions of the pao-chia. Under such conditions even a good man in the office of the pao-tsun has little chance of bringing about any practical measures of social reform.

下行轨道的延伸是为了协助政府命令的实施。虽然通过保甲体制达到了一个更集权化管理的目的，但是由此产生的只有低效，因为在下层存在着僵持的状态，政令很难得到真正的执行。在征税和征募劳役的过程中，这种体制确实取得了更高效的结果。但在所有的地方重建项目或增产活动中，保甲制度做到的只是把有关政令收在保公所文件里。其实，现在大家都认为保存档案成了保甲的一项主要功能。在这种条件下，即使是个能人，身居保正之位也没有什么机会实现任何社会变革的实际举措。

---

[1] Han Fei-tzu, slandered and unable to plead his case, ended his life by taking the poison sent him by his slanderers, according to Ssu-ma Ch'ien's Historical Records (see The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, trans. W. K. Liao [London: A. Probsthain, 1939], I, xxii-xxix).

[2] See chap. i, n. 6.

[3] " 'But it is a pity that a talented person like yon is unwilling to serve the government. Those who are not talented wish to become officials but those who are, only wish to escape it. This is indeed a most regretful matter.'

" 'You are not right,' argued Lao-ts'an. 'It is a matter of no importance whether the common clay wish to become officials or not. The regretful thing lies in the fact that the talented wish to get such posts. As you can see, Mr. Yu is a talented person, but he is too hasty—hasty for promotion, for becoming a big shot. Therefore, he has not hesitated to do many harmful and unreasonable things in order that he may get results. It is unfortunate that his so-called good administration is known far and wide. Don't you think that in a few years he will be promoted, and be still more harmful to society? If he presides over a prefecture, the prefecture would be injured. If he governs a province, the province would suffer, and if he rule the country, the country would be ruined. Therefore, I put to you this question, whether it would be better for the talented to become government officials, or the non-talented?' ” (Liu Ê, A Tramp Doctor's Travelogue, trans. Lin Yi-chin and Ko Te-shun [Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1939], p. 78).

[4] 据司马迁的《史记》记载，韩非子受到诽谤，无以辩驳，因服诽谤他的人送来的毒药而死。见《韩非子全集》英文版，廖文魁翻译，伦敦：阿瑟·普罗赛因公司，1939年，第一卷，xxii—xxix页。

[5] 见第一章注释6（本书注释9，第178页）。

[6] “阁下如此宏材大略，不出来做点事情，实在可惜。无才者抵死要做宫，有才者抵死不做官，此正是天地间第一憾事！

老残道：‘不然。我说无才的要做官很不要紧，正坏在有才的要做官。你想，这个玉大尊不是个有才的吗？只为过于要做官，且急于做大官，所以伤天害理的做到这样。而且政声又如此其好，怕不数年之间就要方面兼圻的吗。官愈大，害愈甚：守一府则一府伤，抚一省则一省残，宰天下则天下死！由此看来，请教还是有才的做官害大，还是无才的做官害大呢？”引自《老残游记》英文版，刘鹗著，林疑今、葛德顺译，上海：商务印书馆，1939年，第78页。

[7] The author seems to be referring to the situation in medieval Europe, neglecting the fact that the bases for the concept of law and of constitutional government in the West are to be found in the formularization of laws, which approached a written constitution in fifth-century Greece and which was later expanded and developed by the Romans. In traditional China the limitations on the power of the monarch, or of his representative, seem never to have been derived from a concept of justice defined by law, written or unwritten.

[8] 作者似指中世纪欧洲的情况，不过忽视了西方法律和宪法政府的概念发源于法律的形成时期，即公元前5世纪希腊成文宪法的制定以及后来罗马人对此的发展。在中国古代，对皇权或其代表的权力的限制的做法，似乎从来都不是衍生自成文或不成文的法律所界定的正义概念。

[9] The typical ya-i would be a man with a little education but not enough to enable him to get ahead. Being literate, he would not want to sink to manual labor.

[10] 一般的衙役通常是受过一点点教育但算不上出类拔萃的人。因为受过教育，他不会情愿沦于从事普通劳动之列。

[11] Lu Hsien, in a short story entitled "Divorce," satirized the role of the gentry in deciding village disputes. A girl wishes to leave her husband and refuses to accept the advice of her relatives. So a member of the local gentry, Squire Seventh, is brought in. The girl thinks, "Those who know the classics and are men of justice must always defend the oppressed." Squire Seventh's authority is urged upon her with the words, "Squire Seventh is a man of wisdom and learning, very different from us villagers, with a knowledge of what is right…. Here is a fact which will not escape Squire Seventh's notice, for those who know the classics and wisdom know everything...." In the end the girl is forced to accept Squire Seventh's obviously biased decision.

[12] 鲁迅在一篇名为《离婚》的短篇小说中，讽刺了士绅在处理乡村纠纷中的角色。一位女子想离开她的丈夫，又不愿听亲戚们的劝导。于是当地的一位乡绅七大人出来劝解。这位女子想：“读经书的一定是有正义感的人，他会帮受害者讲公道话。”七大人的权威促使她说出这样的话：“七大人是知书识理，顶明白的。不像我们乡下人。……这也逃不出七大人的明鉴，知书识理的人什么都知道……”最后那个女子不得不屈从于七大人带有明显偏袒的裁决。

[13] Fei wrote of the village of Kai-hsien-kung, south of Lake Tai, in 1939: "The basis of the headmanship lies in public recognition and support in the leadership in community affairs, and in being the representative of the community against the outside world. Chen started his career as a school-master and Chou as an assistant in the silk factory. Their service and ability have given them authority and prestige. In the village there are few who are literate and still less who are at the same time willing to take up the responsibility without economic reward. Young men of ambition are not satisfied with the position: it is considered by the two middle-school graduates I met in the village as sterile and hopeless. Thus the range for the selection of village heads is not very large.

"Although they have no direct economic reward, they enjoy prestige and presents from the persons who have received services from them. For example, they are respected by the people, and can call the generation senior to them, except their own near kin, by their personal names without adding any relationship term. This cannot be done by an ordinary person.

"Village heads are always accessible, because they are known to every villager, and a stranger will be received by them immediately. The visitor will be impressed by their heavy burden of work. They help the people to read and to write letters and other documents, to make the calculations required in the local credit system, to manage marriage ceremonies, to arbitrate in social disputes, and to look after public property. They are responsible for the system of self-defence, for the management of public funds, and for the transmission and execution of administrative orders from the higher government. They take an active part in introducing beneficial measures such as industrial reform into the village" (Peasant Life in China [New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1939], pp. 108–109 and 106).

[14] 费孝通在1939年记述了太湖南岸一个叫开弦弓的村子：“当村头领的基础在于，不论他们代表社区面向外界时，或是他们在领导社区的事务中，都能得到公众的承认和支持。。陈先生从做学校校长起家，周先生则是做一个丝绸厂的助手。他们的服务和才干使得他们获得了权威和声望。在村子里没几个有文化的人，能不计经济报酬而自愿承担责任的人更少。有报负的年轻人对此职位又看不上——我在村里遇到的两个中学毕业生认为，这是一个枯燥无味且无发展前途的位置。故而，村正人选的选择余地并不大。

“虽然他们没有直接经济收入，但是他们享有很高的声望，接受曾得到他们帮助者的馈赠。比如，他们会受到人们的尊敬，对比他们年长辈分高的一代，除其近亲属外，可以直呼其名而不加表明关系的称谓。这也是一般人所不能做的。

“村正是易于接近的，因为村民都认识他们，外来的生人能很快地得到村正的接待。来访者会对他们庞大的工作量感到吃惊。他们帮助人们读写信件和其他文书，按照当地借贷规则算账，主持结婚典礼，仲裁社会纠纷，管理公共财产。他们要负责地方保安，管理公共基金，传达和执行上级政府的行政命令。他们积极地采取各种有利于本村的措施，村里的蚕丝工业改革就是一例。”引自《江村经济——中国农民的生活》，纽约：杜冬出版公司，1939年，第108—109页和第106页。

[15] The pao-chia, under which ten households, the members of which were held to be mutually responsible for one another's behavior, were grouped in a chia, ten chia forming a pao, was more or less in force in China from 1932 until recently, when the Communists, on taking over the government, abolished it. It had been first instituted in 1069 or 1070 by the famous statesman Wang An-Shih. According to Fei's Peasant Life in China, the pao-chia system was introduced for military purposes, in order to register and organize the people more effectively against the Communists. Yang says: "Since the revival (a supposed revival of an older system of social control) of the pao-chia system, each family must post on the top of the front door, a card bearing the name, age, sex, kinship status, and occupation of the family members…. The government has recently initiated the pao-chia system but the villagers do not, except very rarely, comply with it. They would not report that a son of their neighbour was involved in anything wrong. This reluctance is largely due to the traditional relations between neighbours, which make it very hard for one villager to report another's bad behaviour to a government authority or an outsider. It is also due to the fact that the system was primarily adopted for eliminating politically undesirable persons, especially those who have been accused of being communists, and often a person in disfavour with the political authorities may be on good terms with his fellow villagers" (Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, Taitov, Shangtung Province [New York: Columbia University Press, 1945], pp. 9 and 150).

[16] 保甲制度是指由十户组成一“甲”，一甲的成员对相互的行为负责；十甲组成一“保”。这种保甲制度在中国或多或少地起作用是从1932年开始。当共产党推翻了原政府之后，就将此制度废除了。这一制度最初是在1069年或1070年由著名的政治家王安石建立起来的。照费孝通所著《江村经济——中国农民的生活》一书来看，引入这一保甲制度是基于军事的考虑，为的是对人民进行登记和组织，以此来更有效地阻止当时共产党的发展。杨懋春说：“保甲制度恢复（据称为一种社会控制的旧制度的恢复）之后，每一户家庭都要在自家的大门的门楣上贴上一张卡片，上面写着家庭成员的姓名、年龄、性别、亲属状况和职业……政府最近开始实行保甲制度，但是除了极少数的人，村民并不照此遵守。他们不会举报某个邻居家的儿子犯了什么过错这样的事情。这种不情愿主要是源于传统上的邻里关系，这种关系的存在使得一个村民很难做到向某个政府或是一个外人报告村里另外一个人所做的坏事情；另外还源于这样的事实，那就是之所以采纳这一制度，主要是由于政府要消灭政治上的异己分子，特别是那些被指控为‘赤化分子’的人，而通常对政治当局不满的人可能与其村民同乡关系很好。”引自《一个中国村庄——山东台头》英文版，杨懋春著，纽约：哥伦比亚大学出版社，1945年，第9页和第150页。