Chapter 10：The Quasi-Al l iance：Conversations wi th Mao

1. ?“Memorandum ?of ?Conversation：?Beijing, ?February ?17–18, ?1973, ?11：30 p.m.–1：20 ?a.m.,” ?in ?David ?P. ?Nickles, ?ed., Foreign ?Relations ?of ?the ?United States ?(FRUS), ?1969–1976, ?vol. ?18, ?China ?1973–1976 ?(Washington, ?D.C.：?U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 124.

2. Ibid., 124–25.

3. Ibid., 381.

4. Ibid., 387–88.

5. George Kennan's 1946 “Long Telegram” from Moscow and his nominally anonymous 1947 Foreign Affairs article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” argued that the Soviet Union was driven by ideology to implacable hostility to the United States and the West, and that Soviet-led Communism would expand wherever not met ?by ?a ?resolute ?response. Though ?Kennan ?posited ?that ?Soviet ?pressure ?could be “contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly ?shifting ?geographical ?and ?political ?points,” ?his ?theory ?of ?containment?was ?not ?primarily ?a ?military ?doctrine; ?it ?placed ?significant ?weight ?on ?the ?use ?of diplomatic ?pressure ?and ?the ?power ?of ?internal ?political ?and ?social ?reform ?in ?the non-Communist world as a bulwark against Soviet expansion.

6. ?“Memorandum ?of ?Conversation：?Beijing, ?November ?12, 1973, 5：40–8：25 p.m.,” ?FRUS 18, 385.

7. Ibid., 389.

8. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, then a separate state aligned with Moscow.

9. ?“Memorandum ?from ?the ?President's Assistant ?for ?National ?Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon：Washington, November 1971,” in Steven E. Phillips, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 17, China 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.：U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 548.

10. ?“Memorandum ?of ?Conversation：?Beijing, ?November 12, 1973, 5：40–8：25 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 391.

11. ?“Memorandum ?of ?Conversation：?Beijing, ?February ?17–18, ?1973, ?11：30 p.m.–1：20 a.m.,” ?FRUS 18, 125.

12. “Memorandum of Conversation：Beijing, November 12, 1973, 5：40–8：25 p.m.,” ?FRUS ?18, ?131. According ?to ?some ?accounts, ?Mao's ?list ?of ?the ?countries ?in the horizontal line included China. The word was not translated and did not appear in ?the American ?transcript ?of ?the ?conversation. ?China's ?inclusion ?was ?at ?least implied by the presence of countries to China's east and west.

13. ?Kuisong Yang ?and Yafeng ?Xia, ?“Vacillating ?Between ?Revolution ?and Détente：?Mao's ?Changing ?Psyche ?and ?Policy Toward ?the ?United ?States, ?1969–

1976,” ?Diplomatic History ?34, no. 2 (April 2010)：408.

14. ?“Memorandum ?of ?Conversation：?Beijing, ?October 21, 1975, 6：25–8：05 p.m.,” ?FRUS 18, 794.

15. Yang and Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente,” 413.

16. Ibid., 414.

17. ?“Memorandum ?of ?Conversation：?Beijing, ?February ?15, 1973, 5：57–9：30 p.m.,” ?FRUS 18, 38.

18. Ibid., 32.

19. ?“Memorandum ?of ?Conversation：?Beijing, ?February ?17–18, ?1973, ?11：30 p.m.–1：20 a.m.,” ?FRUS 18, 137.

20. ?See ?Chapter ?13, ?“ ?‘Touching ?the Tiger's ?Buttocks’：The Third Vietnam War,” and Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston：Little, Brown, 1982), 16–18, 339–67.

21. The Chinese analysis proved less accurate than usual for the long term, since the Helsinki Accords, signed in 1975, are now generally recognized as having been a major element in weakening Soviet control of Eastern Europe.