Chapter 3：From Preeminence to Decl ine

1. “Wei Yuan's Statement of a Policy for Maritime Defense, 1842,” in Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, eds., ?China's Response to the West：A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923 ?(Cambridge：Harvard University Press, 1979), 30.

2. Ibid., 31–34.

3. Ibid., 34.

4. ?Opinion ?differs ?as ?to ?whether ?the ?inclusion ?of ?Most ?Favored ?Nation clauses in these initial treaties represented a concerted Chinese strategy or a tactical oversight. ?One ?scholar ?notes ?that ?in ?some ?respects ?it ?curtailed ?the ?Qing ?court's scope of maneuver in subsequent negotiations with the foreign powers, since any Western power could be sure it would gain the benefits afforded to its rivals. On the other hand, the practical effect was to prevent any one colonizer from attaining a dominant economic position—a contrast to the experience of many neighboring countries during this period. See Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 6th ed. (Oxford：Oxford University Press, 2000), 190–92.

5. ?“Wei Yuan's ?Statement ?of ?a ?Policy ?for ?Maritime ?Defense,” ?in Teng ?andFairbank, eds., China's Response to the West, 34.

6. Prince Gong (Yixin), “The New Foreign Policy of January 1861,” in Teng and Fairbank, eds., ?China's Response to the West, 48.

7. Macartney's Journal, in J. L. Cranmer- Byng, ed., An Embassy to China：Being the journal kept by Lord Macartney during his embassy to the Emperor Ch'

ien-lung, 1793–1794 ?(London：Longmans, Green, 1962), 191, 239. 8. ?John ?King ?Fairbank ?and ?Merle ?Goldman, China：?A ?New ?History, ?2nd enlarged ed. (Cambridge：Belknap Press, 2006), 216. For an account of the Taiping Rebellion ?and ?the ?career ?of ?its ?charismatic ?leader ?Hong ?Xiuquan, ?see ?Jonathan Spence, God's Chinese Son ?(New York：W. W. Norton 1996).

9. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China , 209.

10. Ibid., 209–11.

11. ?Bruce ?Elleman, ?Modern ?Chinese ?Warfare, ?1795–1989 ?(New York：Routledge, 2001), 48–50; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China , 212–15.

12. ?Mary ?C. Wright, ?The ?Last ?Stand ?of ?Chinese ?Conservatism：?The ?T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874 , 2nd ed. (Stanford：Stanford University Press, 1962), 233–36.

13. Hsü, ?The Rise of Modern China , 215–18.

14. ?Commenting ?acidly ?on ?the ?loss ?of Vladivostok ?115 ?years ?later ?(and ?on President ?Ford's ?summit ?with ?Soviet ?General ?Secretary ?Leonid ?Brezhnev ?in ?that city), ?Deng ?Xiaoping ?told ?me ?that ?the ?different ?names ?given ?to ?the ?city ?by ?the Chinese ?and ?the ?Russians ?reflected ?their ?respective ?purposes：?the ?Chinese ?name translated ?roughly ?as ?“Sea ?Slug,” ?while ?the ?Russian ?name ?meant ?“Rule ?of ?the East.” “I don't think it has any other meaning except what it means at face value,” he added.

15. “The New Foreign Policy of January 1861,” in Teng and Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West, 48. For consistency within the present volume, the spelling of “Nian” has been changed in this passage from “Nien,” the spelling more common ?at ?the ?time ?of ?the ?quoted ?book's ?publication. The ?underlying ?Chinese word is the same.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Christopher A. Ford, The Mind of Empire：China's History and Modern Foreign Relations (Lexington：University of Kentucky Press, 2010), 142–43.

20. I am indebted to my associate, Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, for bringing this linguistic point to my attention.

21. This account of Li's career draws on events related in William J. Hail, “Li Hung-Chang,” ?in Arthur W. ?Hummel, ?ed., Eminent ?Chinese ?of ?the ?Ch'ing ?Period (Washington, ?D.C.：?U.S. ?Government ?Printing ?Office, ?1943), ?464–71; ?J. ?O. ?P. Bland, ?Li Hung-chang (New York：Henry Holt, 1917); and Edgar Sanderson, ed., Six Thousand Years of World History , vol. 7, Foreign Statesmen ?(Philadelphia：E. R. DuMont, 1900), 425–44.

22. Hail, “Li Hung-Chang,” in Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period , 466.

23. ?“Excerpts ?from Tseng's ?Letters, ?1862,” ?as ?translated ?and ?excerpted ?in Teng and Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West, 62.

24. Li Hung-chang, “Problems of Industrialization,” in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, Imperial China：The Decline of the Last Dynasty and the Origins of Modern China, the 18th and 19th Centuries (New York：Vintage, 1967), 238.

25. Teng and Fairbank, eds., ?China's Response to the West, 87.

26. ?“Letter ?to ?Tsungli Yamen ?Urging ?Study ?of ?Western Arms,” ?in ?ibid., 70–72.

27. “Li Hung-chang's Support of Western Studies,” in ibid., 75.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. As cited in Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, 222.

31. As ?cited ?in ?Jerome ?Ch'en, China ?and ?the ?West：?Society ?and ?Culture, 1815–1937 (Bloomington：Indiana University Press, 1979), 429.

32. According ?to ?the ?fourteenth-century ?“Records ?of ?the ?Legitimate Succession of the Divine Sovereigns” (a work later widely distributed in the 1930s by ?the Thought ?Bureau ?of ?Japan's ?Ministry ?of ?Education)：?“Japan ?is ?the ?divine?country. The heavenly ancestor it was who first laid its foundations, and the Sun Goddess left her descendants to reign over it forever and ever. This is true only of our ?country, ?and ?nothing ?similar ?may ?be ?found ?in ?foreign ?lands. That ?is ?why ?it ?is called the divine country.” John W. Dower, War Without Mercy：Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York：Pantheon, 1986), 222.

33. ?See ?Kenneth ?B. ?Pyle, ?Japan ?Rising ? (New York：?PublicAffairs, ?2007), ? 37–38.

34. ?See ?Karel ?van Wolferen, The ?Enigma ?of ?Japanese ?Power：?People ?and Politics in a Stateless Nation (London：Macmillan, 1989), 13.

35. ?On ?the ?classical ?conception ?of ?a ?Japancentered ?tributary ?order, ?see Michael ?R. Auslin, Negotiating ?with ?Imperialism：?The ?Unequal ?Treaties ?and ?the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy ?(Cambridge：Harvard University Press, 2004), 14; and Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge：Belknap Press, 2000), 69.

36. Jansen, ?The Making of Modern Japan , 87.

37. Cited in Ch'en, ?China and the West , 431. 38. Masakazu Iwata, ?Okubo Toshimichi：The Bismarck of Japan (Berkeley：University ?of ?California ?Press, ?1964), ?citing Wang Yusheng, China ?and ?Japan ?in the Last Sixty Years ?(Tientsin：Ta Kung Pao, 1932–34).

38. The ?occasion ?of ?the ?1874 ?crisis ?was ?a ?shipwreck ?of ?a ?Ryukyu ?Islands crew ?on ?the ?far ?southeast ?coast ?of ?Taiwan, ?and ?the ?murder ?of ?the ?sailors ?by ?a Taiwanese ?tribe. ?When ?Japan ?demanded ?a ?harsh ?indemnity, ?Beijing ?initially responded ?that ?it ?had ?no ?jurisdiction ?over ?un-Sinicized ?tribes. ?In ?the ?traditional Chinese ?view, ?this ?had ?a ?certain ?logic：?“barbarians” ?were ?not ?Beijing's responsibility. Seen in modern international legal and political terms, it was almost certainly a miscalculation, since it signaled that China did not exert full authority over Taiwan. Japan responded with a punitive expedition against the island, which Qing authorities proved powerless to stop. Tokyo then prevailed on Beijing to pay an indemnity, which one contemporary observer called “a transaction which really sealed ?the ?fate ?of ?China, ?in ?advertising ?to ?the ?world ?that ?here ?was ?a ?rich ?Empire which was ready to pay, but not ready to fight.” (Alexander Michie, An Englishman?in ?China ?During ?the ?Victorian ?Era, ?vol. ?2 ?[London：William ?Blackwood ?& ?Sons, 1900], ?256.) What ?made ?the ?crisis ?additionally ?damaging ?to ?China ?was ?that ?until that point, both Beijing and Tokyo had laid claim to the Ryukyu Islands as a tribute state; ?after ?the ?crisis, ?the ?islands ?fell ?under ?Japan's ?sway. ?See ?Hsü, ?The ?Rise ?of Modern China , 315–17.

39. Teng and Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West , 71.

40. As quoted in Bland, ?Li Hung-chang, 160.

41. Ibid., 160–61.

42. “Text of the Sino-Russian Secret Treaty of 1896,” in Teng and Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West, 131.

43. Bland, Li Hung-chang, 306.

44. ?For ?an ?account ?of ?these ?events ?and ?of ?the ?Chinese ?court's ?internal deliberations, see Hsü, The Rise of Modern China , 390–98.

45. ?In ?contrast ?with ?earlier ?indemnities, ?most ?of ?the ?Boxer ?indemnity ?was later renounced or redirected by the foreign powers to charitable enterprises within China. The United States directed a portion of its indemnity to the construction of Tsinghua University in Beijing.

46. These strategies are recounted in compelling detail in Scott A. Boorman, The Protracted Game：A Wei-ch’I Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy (New York：Oxford University Press, 1969).

47. ?Jonathan ?Spence, The ?Search ?for ?Modern ?China ?(New York：?W. ?W. Norton, 1999), 485.